Three aspects of the self(private, public, collective) with different probabilities in different kinds of social environments were sampled. Three dimensions of cultural variation (individualism--collectivism, tightness-looseness, cultural complexity) are discussed in relation to the sampling of these three aspects of the self. The more complex the culture, the more frequent the sampling of the public and private self and the less frequent the sampling of the collective self. The more individualistic the culture, the more frequent the sampling of the private self and the less frequent the sampling of the collective self. Collectivism, external threat, competition with outgroups, and common fate increase the sampling of the collective self. Cultural homogeneity results in tightness and in the sampling of the collective self. The article outlines theoretical links among aspects of the environment, childrearing patterns, and cultural patterns, which are linked to differential sampling of aspects of the self. Such sampling has implications for social behavior. Empirical investigations of some of these links are reviewed.
have implications for the way people sample information (sampiing information that is self-relevant more frequently than information that is not self-relevant), the way they process information (sampling more quickly information that is self-relevant than information that is not self-relevant), and the way they assess information (assessing more positively information that supports their current self-structure than information that challenges their self-structure). Thus, for instance, a self-instruction such as "I must do X" is more likely to be evaluated positively, and therefore accepted, if it maintains the current self-structure than if it changes this structure. This has implications for behavior because such self-instructions are among the several processes that lead to behavior (Triandis, 1977 (Triandis, , 1980 . In other words, the self is an active agent that promotes differential sampling, processing, and evaluation of information from the environment, and thus leads to differences in social behavior. Empirical evidence about the link of measures of the self to behavior is too abundant to review here. A sample will suffice: People whose self-concept was manipulated so that they thought of themselves (a) as "charitable" gave more to charity (Kraut, 1973) , (b) as "neat and tidy" threw less garbage on the floor (Miller, Brickman, & Bolen, 1975) , and (c) as "honest" were more likely to return a pencil (Shotland & Berger, 1970) . Self-definition results in behaviors consistent with that definition (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982) . People who defined themselves as doers of a particular behavior were more likely to do that behavior (Greenwald, Carnot, Beach, & Young, 1987) . Identity salience leads to behaviors consistent with that identity (Stryker & Serpe (1982) . Self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974) has been linked to numerous behaviors (e.g., Snyder, 1987; Snyder, Simpson, & Gangestad, 1986) . The more an attitude (an aspect of the self) is accessible to memory, the more likely it is to determine behavior (Fazio & Williams, 1986) . Those with high selfesteem were found to be more likely to behave independently of group norms (Ziller, 1973) .
As Snyder (1987) has shown, the differences between those who do more sampling of social situations (high self-monitors) and those who do more sampling of the self (low self-monitors) have implications about the way people feel, what they believe, and how their attitudes are linked to behavior. The pattern of differences described by Snyder has implications for every aspect of social motivation.
To the extent such aspects are shared by people who speak a common language and who are able to interact because they live in adjacent locations during the same historical period, we can refer to all of these elements as a cultural group's subjective culture (Triandis, 1972) . This implies that people who speak different languages (e.g., English and Chinese) or live in nonadjacent locations (e.g., England and Australia) or who have lived in different time periods (e.g., 19th and 20th centuries) may have different subjective cultures.
Some aspects of the self may be universal. "I am hungry" may well be an element with much the same meaning worldwide, and across time. Other elements are extremely culture-specific. For instance, they depend on the particular mythology-religion-world-view and language of a culture. "My soul will be reincarnated" is culture-specific. Some elements of the self imply action. For example, "I should be a high achiever" implies specific actions under conditions in which standards of excellence are present. Other elements do not imply action (e.g., I am tall).
Contradictions among elements of the self are apparently more tolerated in some cultures than in others. Bbarati (1985) argued that in India the self contains many contradictory elements, because all elements are seen as aspects of unitary universal forces.
The self may be coterminous with the body (e.g., a Western view) or with a group such as the family or the tribe (an African and Asian view, at least in some cases), and may be conceived as independent of groups or as a satelite of groups (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1973; Shweder & Bourne, 1982) . Corresponding to a body-bounded self may be a name (as in the West), or a person's name may be a nonsense syllable (Geertz, 1963) that is rarely used, and instead, people are referred to by teknonyms (e.g., mother of X).
One major distinction among aspects of the self is between the private, public, and collective self (Baumeister, 1986b; Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984) . Thus, we have the following: the private se/f--cognitions that involve traits, states, or behaviors of the person (e.g., "I am introverted," "I am honest," "I will buy X"); thepublic self--cognitions concerning the generalized other's view of the self, such as "People think I am introverted" or "People think I will buy X"; and the collective self---cognitions concerning a view of the self that is found in some collective (e.g., family, coworkers, tribe, scientific society); for instance, "My family thinks I am introverted" or "My coworkers believe I travel too much."
The argument of this article is that people sample these three kinds of selves with different probabilities, in different cultures, and that has specific consequences for social behavior.
The private self is an assessment of the self by the self. The public self corresponds to an assessment of the self by the generalized other. The collective self corresponds to an assessment of the se If by a specific reference group. Taj tel's ( 1978 ) notion of a social identity, "that part of the individual's self-concept which derives from his (or her) knowledge ofhis (her) membership in a social group (or groups) together with the values and emotional significance attached to that membership," (p. 63) is part of the collective self. Tajfel's theory is that people choose ingroups that maximize their positive social identity. However, that notion reflects an individualistic emphasis, because in many collectivist cultures people do not have a choice of ingroups. For instance, even though the Indian constitution has banned castes, caste is still an important aspect of social identity in that culture. Historical factors shape different identities (Baumeister, 1986a) .
The notion of sampling has two elements: a universe of units to be sampled and a probability of choice of a unit from that universe. The universe can be more or less complex. By complexity is meant that the number of distinguishable elements might be few versus many, the differentiation within the elements may be small or large, and the integration of the elements may be small or large. The number of nonoverlapping elements (e.g., I am bold; I am sensitive) is clearly relevant to complexity. The differentiation of the elements refer to the number of distinctions made within the element. For example, in the case of the social class element, a person may have a simple conception with little differentiation (e.g., people who are unemployed vs. working vs. leading the society) or a complex conception with much differentiation (e.g., rich, with new money, well educated vs. rich with new money, poorly educated). Integration refers to the extent a change in one element changes few versus many elements. Self-structures in which changes in one element result in changes in many elements are more complex than selfstructures in which such changes result in changes of only a few elements (Rokeach, 1960) .
In families in which children are urged to be themselves, in which "finding yourself" is valued, or in which self-actualization is emphasized, the private self is likely to be complex• In cultures in which families emphasize "what other people will think about you,' the public self is likely to be complex. In cultures in which specific groups are emphasized during socialization (e.g., "remember you are a member of this family;' "... you are a Christian"), the collective self is likely to be complex, and the norms, roles, and values of that group acquire especially great emotional significance.
The probability of sampling refers to whether the element that will be sampled is more likely to be an element of the private, public, or collective self. Thus, if the private self is complex, there are more "private-self units" that can be sampled, and thus the probability that the private self will be sampled will be high; correspondingly with the other selves, if they are complex they have a higher probability of being sampled.
In addition to differences in the complexity of the private, public, and collective self, the salience of the units that constitute these selves is likely to be different. Units of a particular self are likely to interact among themselves. Each time a unit is activated, adjacent and similar units will increase in salience, as the well-known phenomena of stimulus and response generalization suggest. Thus, the fact that a unit of the private self (e.g., I am bold) is activated increases the chances that other units of the private self(e.g., "I am fearless;" even "I am confident") will become more salient than they were. Salience of a unit increases its probability of being sampled.
One of many methods that are available to study the self requires writing 20 sentence completions that begin with "I am ." (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954) . The answers can be contentanalyzed to determine whether they correspond to the private, public, or collective self. If a social group is part of the answer (e.g., I am a son = family; I am a student = educational institution; I am Roman Catholic = religion), one can classify the response as part of the collective self. If the generalized other is mentioned (e.g., I am liked by most people), it is part of the public self. If there is no reference to an entity outside the person (e.g., I am bold), it can be considered a part of the private self. Experience with this scoring method shows that coders can reach interrater reliabilities in the .9+ range. The percentage of the collective responses varies from 0 to 100, with sample means in Asian cultures in the 20 to 52% range and in European and North American samples between 15 and 19%. Public-self responses are relatively rare, so sample means of private-self responses (with student samples) are commonly in the 81 to 85% range. In addition to such content analyses, one can examine the availability (how frequently a particular group, e.g., the family, is mentioned) and the accessibility (when is a particular group mentioned for the first time in the rank-order) of responses (Higgins & King, 1981) .
This method is useful because it provides an operational definition of the three kinds of selves under discussion. Also, salience is reflected directly in the measure of accessibility, and the complexity of particular self is suggested by the availability measure.
Although this method has many advantages, a multimethod strategy for the study of the self is highly recommended, because every method has some limitations and convergence across methods increases the validity of our measurements. Furthermore, when methods are used in different cultures in which people have different expectations about what can be observed, asked, or analyzed, there is an interaction between culture and method. But when methods converge similarly in different cultures and when the antecedents and consequences of the selfconstruct in each culture are similar, one can have greater confidence that the construct has similar or equivalent meanings across cultures.
Other methods that can tap aspects of the self have included interviews (e.g., Lobel, 1984) , Q-sorts of potentially self-descriptive attributes (e.g., Block, 1986) , the Multistage Social Identity Inquirer (Zavalloni, 1975; Zavalloni & Louis-Guerin, 1984) , and reaction times when responding to whether a specific attribute is self-descriptive (Rogers, 1981) .
The utility of the distinction among the various selves can be seen in Hogan and Cheek (1983) and Breckler and Greenwald (1986) . The latter integrates many social psychological phenomena using these distinctions. However, other distinctions seem to be useful as well, such as the ideal versus actual self, the desired versus undesired self (Ogilvie, 1987) , and discrepancies among various selves that correspond to distinct emotional states (Higgins, 1987) .
The self is dynamic (Markus & Wurf, 1987) , so that different elements of the self will be sampled in different situations, across time, moods (e.g., Szalay & Deese, 1978) , and depending on negotiations the person has had with others about the way the situation is to be defined. Depending on which elements are sampled and if the elements have action components, social behavior will be influenced by the particular self. Sampling of both public and collective elements suggests an allocentric self; sampling of exclusively private elements suggests an idiocentric self. Of course, in most cases the elements that are sampled are of all three (private, public, collective) kinds.
A number of social psychological literatures, such as those dealing with self-monitoring (e.g., Snyder, 1974; , self-consciousness (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1985) , and the complexity of the self(e.g., Linville, 1985) , can be related to the distinctions made earlier. High self-monitors sample the situation and sample the public self more than do low self-monitors, who have a more stable (situation independent) self and sample mostly the private self; the distinction between private and public self-consciousness is obviously related to such differential sampling; highly complex selves should include more elements in all three domains of the self, although no research on this seems to have been reported in the literature, as yet.
I have defined the self as one element of subjective culture (when it is shared by members of a culture) and distinguished the private, public, and collective selves, and indicated that the complexity of these selves will depend on cultural variables. The more complex a particular self, the more probable it is that it will be sampled. Sampling of a particular self will increase the probability that behaviors implicated in this aspect of the self will occur, when situations favor such occurrence. For example, data suggest that people from East Asia sample their collective self more frequently than do Europeans or North Americans. This means that elements of their reference groups, such as group norms or group goals, will be more salient among Asians than among Europeans or North Americans. In the next section I will describe cultural variation along certain theoretical dimensions that are useful for organizing the information about the sampling of different selves, and hence can account for differences in social behavior across cultures.
Cultural Patterns
There is evidence of different selves across cultures (Marsella et al., 1985) . However, the evidence has not been linked systematically to particular dimensions of cultural variation. This section will define three of these dimensions.
Cultural complexity. A major difference across cultures is in cultural complexity. Consider the contrast between the human bands that existed on earth up to about 15,000 years ago and the life of a major metropolitan city today. According to archaeological evidence, the bands rarely included more than 30 individuals. The number of relationships among 30 individuals is relatively small; the number of relationships in a major metropolitan area is potentially almost infinite. The number of potential relationships is one measure of cultural complexity. Students of this construct have used many others. One can get reliable rank orders by using information about whether cultures have writing and records, fixity of residence, agriculture, urban settlements, technical specialization, land transport other than walking, money, high population densities, many levels of political integration, and many levels of social stratification. Cultures that have all of these attributes (e.g., the Romans, the Chinese of the 5th century B.C., modern industrial cultures) are quite complex. As one or more of the aforementioned attributes are missing, the cultures are more simple, the simplest including the contemporary food gathering cultures (e.g., the nomads of the Kalahari desert).
Additional measures of complexity can be obtained by examining various domains of culture. Culture includes language, technology, economic, political, and educational systems, religious and aesthetic patterns, social structures, and so on. One can analyze each of these domains by considering the number of distinct elements that can be identified in it. For example, (a) language can be examined by noting the number of terms that are available (e.g., 600 camel-related terms in Arabic; many terms about automobiles in English), (b) economics by noting the number of occupations (the U.S. Employment and Training Administration's Dictionary of Occupational Titles contains more than 250,000), and (c) religion by noting the number of different functions (e.g., 6,000 priests in one temple in Orissa, India, each having a different function). The subject is left to the specialists such as Carneiro (1970) , Lomax and Berkowitz (1972) , and Murdock and Provost (1973) , who do have reliable ways of measuring the construct.
One of the consequences of increased complexity is that individuals have more and more potential ingroups toward whom they may or may not be loyal. As the number of potential ingroups increases, the loyalty of individuals to any one ingroup decreases. Individuals have the option of giving priority to their personal goals rather than to the goals of an ingroup. Also, the greater the affluence of a society, the more financial independence can be turned into social and emotional independence, with the individual giving priority to personal rather than ingroup goals. Thus, as societies become more complex and affluent, they also can become more individualistic. However, there are some moderator variables that modify this simple picture, that will be discussed later, after I examine more closely the dimension of individualism-collectivism.
Individualism-collectivism. Individualists give priority to personal goals over the goals of collectives; collectivists either make no distinctions between personal and collective goals, or if they do make such distinctions, they subordinate their personal goals to the collective goals (Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988) . Closely related to this dimension, in the work of Hofstede (1980) , is power distance (the tendency to see a large difference between those with power and those without power). Collectivists tend to be high in power distance.
Although the terms individualism and collectivism should be used to characterize cultures and societies, the terms idiocentric and allocentric should be used to characterize individuals. Triandis, Leung, Villareal, and Clack (1985) have shown that within culture (Illinois) there are individuals who differ on this dimension, and the idiocentrics report that they are concerned with achievement, but are lonely, whereas the allocentrics report low alienation and receiving much social support. These findings were replicated in Puerto Rico (Triandis et al., 1988) . The distinction of terms at the cultural and individual levels of analysis is useful because it is convenient when discussing the behavior of allocentrics in individualist cultures and idiocentries in collectivist cultures (e.g., Bontempo, Lobel, & Triandis, 1989) .
In addition to subordinating personal to collective goals, collectivists tend to be concerned about the results of their actions on members of their ingroups, tend to share resources with ingroup members, feel interdependent with ingroup members, and feel involved in the lives of ingroup members . They emphasize the integrity of ingroups over time and de-emphasize their independence from ingroups ).
Shweder's data (see Shweder & LeVine, 1984) suggest that collectivists perceive ingroup norms as universally valid (a form of ethnocentrism). A considerable literature suggests that collectivists automatically obey ingroup authorities and are willing to fight and die to maintain the integrity of the ingronp, whereas they distrust and are unwilling to cooperate with members of outgroups (Triandis, 1972) . However, the definition of the ingroup keeps shifting with the situation. Common fate, common outside threat, and proximity (which is often linked to common fate) appear to be important determinants of the ingroup/outgroup boundary. Although the family is usually the most important ingroup, tribe, coworkers, co-religionists, and members of the same political or social collective or the same aesthetic or scientific persuasion can also function as important ingroups. When the state is under threat, it becomes the ingroup.
Ingroups can also be defined on the basis of similarity (in demographic attributes, activities, preferences, or institutions) and do influence social behavior to a greater extent when they are stable and impermeable (difficult to gain membership or difficult to leave). Social behavior is a function of ingroup norms to a greater extent in collectivist than individualist cultures. (Davidson, Jaccard, Triandis, Morales, and Diaz-Guerrero, 1976) .
In collectivist cultures, ingroups influence a wide range of social situations (e.g., during the cultural revolution in China, the state had what was perceived as "legitimate influence" on every collective). In some cases, the influence is extreme (e.g., the Rev. Jones's People's Temple influenced 911 members of that collective to commit suicide in 1978).
In collectivist cultures, role relationships that include ingroup members are perceived as more nurturant, respectful, and intimate than they are in individualistic cultures; those that include outgroup members are perceived to be more manipulative and exploitative in collectivist than in individualist cultures (Sinha, 1982; Triandis, Vassiliou, & Nassiakou, 1968) . In other words, more ingroup social relationships are communal in the collectivist and more exchange relationships can be found in the individualist cultures. Outgroup relationships follow exchange patterns everywhere.
The distinction between communal and exchange relations (Mills & Clark, 1982) is useful. The attributes of communal and exchange relationships involve a number of contrasts, such as (a) lack of clarity versus clarity about what is to be exchanged, and when and where, (b) concern for the other person's needs versus concern for equity, (c) importance of maintaining equality of affect (if one is sad, the other is sad) as opposed to emotional detachment, (d) inequality of the benefits exchanged versus equality or equity bases of the benefits exchanged, and (e) benefits are not comparable versus benefits are comparable. Mills and Clark (I 982) gave many examples in which exchange theory (e.g., Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) does not seem to provide adequate accounts of social behavior, makes predictions about the conditions under which exchange theory will be adequate, and tests experimentally some of these predictions. We expect that in collectivistic cultures the applicability of exchange theories will be more limited than in individualistic cultures.
As discussed earlier, over the course of cultural evolution there has been a shift toward individualism (i.e., exchange rela-tionships). Content analyses of social behaviors recorded in written texts (Adamopoulos & Bontempo, 1986 ) across historical periods show a shift from communal to exchange relationships. Behaviors related to trading are characteristic of individualistic cultures, and contracts emancipated individuals from the bonds of tribalism (Pearson, 1977) .
The distribution of collectivism-individualism, according to Hofstede's (1980) data, contrasts most of the Latin American, Asian, and African cultures with most of the North American and Northern and Western European cultures. However, many cultures are close to the middle of the dimension, and other variables are also relevant. Urban samples tend to be individualistic, and traditional-rural samples tend toward collectivism within the same culture (e.g., Greece in the work of Dournanis, 1983; Georgas, 1989; and Katakis, 1984) . Within the United States one can find a good deal of range on this variable, with Hispanic samples much more collectivist than samples of Northern and Western European backgrounds (G. Marin & Triandis, 1985) .
The major antecedents of individualism appear to be cultural complexity and affluence. The more complex the culture, the greater the number of ingroups that one may have, so that a person has the option of joining ingroups or even forming new ingroups. Affluence means that the individual can be independent of ingroups. If the ingroup makes excessive demands, the individual can leave it. Mobility is also important. As individuals move (migration, changes in social class) they join new ingroups, and they have the opportunity to join ingroups whose goals they find compatible with their own. Furthermore, the more costly it is in a particular ecology for an ingronp to reject ingroup members who behave according to their own goals rather than according to ingroup goals, the more likely are people to act in accordance with their personal goals, and thus the more individualistic is the culture. Such costs are high when the ecology is thinly populated. One can scarcely afford to reject a neighbor if one has only one neighbor. Conversely, densely populated ecologies are characterized by collectivism, not only because those who behave inappropriately can be excluded, but also because it is necessary to regulate behavior more strictly to overcome problems of crowding.
As rewards from ingroup membership increase, the more likely it is that a person will use ingroup goals as guides for behavior. Thus, when ingroups provide many rewards (e.g., emotional security, status, income, information, services, willingness to spend time with the person) they tend to increase the person's commitment to the ingroup and to the culture's collectivism.
The size ofingroups tends to be different in the two kinds of cultures. In collectivist cultures, ingroups tend to be small (e.g., family), whereas in individualist cultures they can be large (e.g., people who agree with me on important attitudes).
Child-rearing patterns are different in collectivist and individualist cultures. The primary concern of parents in collectivist cultures is obedience, reliability, and proper behavior. The primary concern of parents in individualistic cultures is selfreliance, independence, and creativity. Thus, we find that in simple, agricultural societies, socialization is severe and conformity is demanded and obtained (Berry, 1967 (Berry, , 1979 . Similarly, in working-class families in industrial societies, the socialization pattern leads to conformity (Kohn, 1969 (Kohn, , 1987 . In more individualist cultures such as food gatherers (Berry, 1979) and very individualistic cultures such as the United States, the childrearing pattern emphasizes self-reliance and independence; children are allowed a good deal of autonomy and are encouraged to explore their environment. Similarly, creativity and selfactualization are more important traits and are emphasized in child-rearing in the professional social classes (Kohn, 1987) .
It is clear that conformity is functional in simple, agricultural cultures (if one is to make an irrigation system, each person should do part of the job in a well-coordinated plan) and in working-class jobs (the boss does not want subordinates who do their own thing). Conversely, it is disfunctional in hunting cultures, in which one must be ingenious, and in professional jobs, in which one must be creative. The greater the cultural complexity, the more is conformity to one ingroup disfunctional, inasmuch as one cannot take advantage of new opportunities available in other parts of the society.
The smaller the family size, the more the child is allowed to do his or her own thing. In large families, rules must be imposed, otherwise chaos will occur. As societies become more affluent (individualistic), they also reduce the size of the family, which increases the opportunity to raise children to be individualists. Autonomy in child-rearing also leads to individualism. Exposure to other cultures (e.g., through travel or because of societal heterogeneity) also increases individualism, inasmuch as the child becomes aware of different norms and has to choose his or her own standards of behavior.
Although both collectivism and individualism have elements that are characteristic of all collectivist and all individualist cultures (Triandis, 1978) , there are also culture-specific collectivist and culture-specific individualist elements. There is a large literature that described cultural patterns, that cannot be reviewed here. Interested readers can find details about the culture-specific forms of these cultural patterns in the following publications: for collectivism in Africa (Holzberg, 1981) , Bali (Geertz, 1963) , China (Deem & Salaman, 1985; Feather, 1986; Hsu, 1981; Hui, 1984; Wu, 1985; Yang, 1986) , Egypt (Rugh, 1985) , Greece (Doumanis, 1983; Katakis, 1984; Triandis, 1972) , India (Sinha, 1982) , Italy (Banfield, 1958; Strodtbeck, 1958) , Japan (Caudill & Sca~, 1962; Lebra, 1976; Mendenhall & Oddon, 1986) , among U.S. Jews (Strodtbeck, 1958) , Latin America (Diaz-Guerrero, 1979; Holtzman, Diaz-Guerrero, & Swartz, 1975; Marin & Triandis, 1985; Tallman, Marotz-Baden, & Pindas, 1983; Triandis, Marin, Hui, Lisansky, & Ottati, 1984; Triandis, Matin, Lisansky, & Betancourt, 1984) , Navaho tribes (Northrop, 1949) , Philippines (Church, 1987; Guthrie, 1961) , Turkey (Basaran, 1986) , the USSR (Kaiser, 1984) , and in U.S. corporations (Whyte, 1956) . The contrasting pattern ofindividualism is best described for the case of the United States in such publications as Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swindler, and Tipton (1985) , Kerlinger (1984) , Wallach and Wallach (1983), and Waterman (1984) . Decision making differs in collectivist and individualist cultures (Gaenslen, 1986) . A summary of the common elements that characterize the two cultural patterns can be found in Triandis et al., (1988) .
Tight versus loose cultures. In collectivist cultures, ingronps demand that individuals conform to ingroup norms, role definitions, and values. When a society is relatively homogeneous, the norms and values of ingroups are similar. But heterogeneous societies have groups with dissimilar norms. If an in-group member deviates from ingroup norms, ingroup members may have to make the painful decision of excluding that individual from the ingroup. Because rejection ofingroup members is emotionally draining, cultures develop tolerance for deviation from group norms. As a result, homogeneous cultures are often rigid in requiring that ingroup members behave according to the ingroup norms. Such cultures are tight. Heterogeneous cultures and cultures in marginal positions between two major cultural patterns are flexible in dealing with ingroup members who deviate from ingroup norms. For example, Japan is considered tight, and it is relatively homogeneous. Thailand is considered loose, and it is in a marginal position between the major cultures of India and China; people are pulled in different directions by sometimes contrasting norms, and hence they must be more flexible in imposing their norms. In short, tight cultures (Pelto, 1968) have clear norms that are reliably imposed. Little deviation from normative behavior is tolerated, and severe sanctions are administered to those who deviate. Loose cultures either have unclear norms about most social situations or tolerate deviance from the norms. For example, it is widely reported in the press that Japanese children who return to Japan after a period of residence in the West, are criticized most severely by teachers because their behavior is not "proper." Japan is a tight culture in which deviations that would be considered trivial in the West (such as bringing Western food rather than Japanese food for lunch) are noted and criticized. In loose cultures, deviations from "proper" behavior are tolerated, and in many cases there are no standards of "proper" behavior. Theocracies are prototypical of tight cultures, but some contemporary relatively homogeneous cultures (e.g., the Greeks, the Japanese) are also relatively tight. In a heterogeneous culture, such as the United States, it is more difficult for people to agree on specific norms, and even more difficult to impose severe sanctions. Geographic mobility allows people to leave the offended communities in ways that are not available in more stable cultures. Urban environments are more loose than rural environments, in which norms are clearer and sanctions can be imposed more easily. Prototypical of loose cultures are the Lapps and the Thais. In very tight cultures, according to Pelto, one finds corporate control of property, corporate ownership of stored food and production power, religious figures as leaders, hereditary recruitment into priesthood, and high levels of taxation.
The latter list of attributes suggests that collectivism and tightness are related, but the two cultural patterns can be kept distinct for analytical purposes. It is theoretically possible for a group to be collectivist (give priority to ingroup goals) yet allow considerable deviation from group norms before imposing sanctions. For example, a group may have the norm that group goals should be given priority over personal goals, but may do nothing when individuals deviate substantially from that norm.
A case reported in the Chinese press (Peking Daily, May 1987) is interesting: A student, whose behavior was bizarre, was assumed to be an "individualist" and was not diagnosed as mentally ill until he killed a fellow student, at which point the authorities took action. China is a collectivist, but "relatively" loose culture.
The intolerance of inappropriate behavior characteristic of tight cultures does not extend to all situations. In fact, tight cultures are quite tolerant of foreigners (they do not know better), and of drunk, and mentally ill persons. They may even have rituals in which inappropriate behavior is expected. For example, in a tight culture such as Japan one finds the office beer party as a ritual institution, where one is expected to get drunk and to tell the boss what one "really" thinks of him (it is rarely her). Similarly, in loose cultures, there are specific situations in which deviance is not tolerated. For example, in Orissa (India), a son who cuts his hair the day after his father dies is bound to be severely criticized, although the culture is generally loose.
Relationships among dimensions of cultural variation. Individualism is related to complexity according to a curvilinear function, because protoindividualism is found in nomadic groups of food gatherers. Such groups, although characterized by intensive involvement with a family or band, allow individuals to have considerable freedom of action outside the collective because it is more effective to gather food in a dispersed rather than in a collective manner. In agricultural societies one finds high levels of collectivism, and most theocracies have an agricultural basis. In modern industrial settings one finds neoindividualism, in which, again, a small group, the family or the work group, plays an important role in determining behavior, but the individual has considerable freedom of action outside the group. Because complexity increases from food gathering, to agricultural, to industrial societies, the relationship of individualism and complexity is curvilinear.
Child-rearing patterns also follow a curvilinear pattern with complexity. Simple food gathering and hunting cultures tend to socialize their children with emphasis on independence and self-reliance; agricultural, more complex cultures, tend to emphasize obedience; very complex industrial cultures, particularly among cognitive complex (professionals, upper class) subsamples, emphasize, again, independence and self reliance (Berry, 1967 (Berry, , 1979 Kohn, 1969 Kohn, , 1987 .
Cultural complexity and tightness are not related; it is possible to identify types of cultures in the four quadrants defined by these two variables: Boldt (1978) has described the loose/ complex quadrant as characteristic of the industrial democracies, the tight/complex quadrant as characteristic of the totalitarian industrial states, the loose/simple quadrant as characteristic of hunters and gatherers, and the tight/simple quadrant as characteristic of the agricultural simple cultures.
Finally, the relationship between collectivism and tightness is likely to be linear, but probably not very strong. Because the two constructs have different antecedents (collectivism = common fate, limited resources that must be divided in order to survive; tightness = cultural homogeneity, isolation from external cultural influences), we can expect many exceptions from the pattern of tightness and collectivism versus looseness and individualism.
I have defined the dimensions of cultural complexity, individualism, and tightness. In the next section I examine how these dimensions influence the probability that the private, public, or collective self will be sampled, and hence the patterns of social behavior that are most likely in different cultures.
Culture and Self
Culture is to society what memory is to the person. It specifies designs for living that have proven effective in the past, ways of dealing with social situations, and ways to think about the self and social behavior that have been reinforced in the past. It in-eludes systems of symbols that facilitate interaction (Geertz, 1973) , rules of the game of life that have been shown to "work" in the past. When a person is socialized in a given culture, the person can use custom as a substitute for thought, and save time.
The three dimensions of cultural variation just described refleet variations in culture that have emerged because of different ecologies, such as ways of surviving. Specifically, in cultures that survive through hunting or food gathering, in which people are more likely to survive if they work alone or in small groups because game is dispersed, individualism emerges as a good design for living. In agricultural cultures, in which cooperation in the building of irrigation systems and food storage and distribution facilities is reinforced, collectivists designs for living emerge. In complex, industrial cultures, in which loosely linked ingroups produce the thousands of parts of modern machines (e.g., a 747 airplane), individuals often find themselves in situations in which they have to choose ingroups or even form their own ingroups (e.g., new corporation). Again, individualistic designs for living become more functional. In homogeneous cultures, one can insist on tight norm enforcement; in heterogeneous, or fast changing, or marginal (e.g., confiuence of two major cultural traditions) cultures, the imposition of tight norms is difficult because it is unclear whose norms are to be used. A loose culture is more likely in such ecologies.
Over time, cultures become more complex, as new differentiations prove effective. However, once complexity reaches very high levels, moves toward simplification emerge as reactions to too much complexity. For example, in art styles, the pendulum has been swinging between the "less is more" view of Oriental art and the "more is better" view of the Roccoco period in Europe. Similarly, excessive individualism may create a reaction toward collectivism, and excessive collectivism, a reaction toward individualism; or tightness may result from too much looseness, and looseness from too much tightness. Thus, culture is dynamic, ever changing.
Similarly the self is dynamic, ever changing. It changes in different environments (e.g., school vs. home, see McGuire, McGuire, & Chcever, 1986) , when the group climates are different (e.g., Aronson, 1986) , or when drugs are used (e.g., Hull, 1986) .
The three dimensions of cultural variation described earlier are systematically linked to different kinds of self. In this section I provide hypotheses linking culture and self.
Individualism-Collectivism
Child-rearing patterns in individualistic cultures tend to emphasize self-reliance, independence, finding yourself, and selfactualization. As discussed earlier, such child-rearing increases the complexity of the private self, and because there are more elements of the private self to be sampled, more are sampled. Thus, the probability that the private rather than the other selves will be sampled increases with individualism. Conversely, in collectivist cultures, child-rearing emphasizes the importance of the collective; the collective self is more complex and more likely to be sampled.
The expected lower rates of sampling of the collective self in individualistic cultures was obtained by Triandis in research to be reported. University of Hawaii students of Northern European backgrounds were compared with University of Hawaii students of Japanese, Chinese, or F'flipino backgrounds. The mean percentages of their responses that referred to a "social category" (family, ethnicity, occupation, institution, religious group, or gender), after completing 20 sentences that started with "I am... ," were 17 to 21 for students of different European backgrounds and 19 to 29 for students of Asian and Pacific backgrounds. When a sample of students from the University of Illinois (n = 159) was compared with another sample from Hawaii (n = 64), the mean social category responses from Illinois were 19% and from Hawaii 29%. Social psychology students (n = 118) from the University of Athens, Greece, who were found to be quite individualistic by other measurements, had a mean of 15%; social psychology students from the University of Hong Kong (n = 112), who are fast becoming individualistic but still have collectivist tendencies, had a mean of 20%; ~ university graduates from the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC; n = 34) attending a course taught by Triandis had a mean of 52%.
One can ask what social categories constituted these percentages. An Illinois sample of 188 men and 202 women indicated that family and educational institution were the most important categories. Family was more important for the women (2.0 average availability vs. 1.4 for men, p < .001; average accessibility of 12 for women vs. 9 for men, p < .000), but athletic club was more important for men than for women (1.2 in availability vs. 0.5, p < .000; 8 in accessibility vs. 4, p < .000, respectively). Gender was more accessible to the women than to the men (11 vs. 8, p < .002, respectively). Similarly, family was most important for the PRC sample. Athletic club, religion, age, and race were categories used by Americans but not by the PRC, whereas work unit, Communist Party, and "mass clubs" (e.g., chess club) were used by the PRC but not by the American samples. The Greek samples were like the U.S. sample; specifically, the Greek women were much like the U.S. women (e.g., gender was more important for them than it was for the Greek men).
Of course, samples of students are unusual (Sears, 1986) , and from our theoretical perspective, they should be highly individualistic. It seems likely that nonliterate populations, with few ingroups, will give a larger percentage of their responses as social categories. Furthermore, keeping literacy levels constant, one would expect a curvilinear relationship between the hunting/gathering-agricultural-industrial continuum and percentage social category, with a maximum to be obtained in agricultural samples.
Social class should also moderate the sampling of the collective self. One expects upper-middle-and upper-class individuals to sample the collective selfless frequently than lower class individuals, although lower lower-class individuals may again sample more the private self. This expectation derives from reliable differences in child-rearing patterns (Kohn, 1969 (Kohn, , 1987 , which indicate that in many societies (Italy, Japan, Poland, the U.S.) child-rearing emphasizes conformity to family norms in the lower classes and self-direction, creativity, and independence from the ingroup in the upper social classes. The lower lower class might be an exception, because the evidence (see Triandis, I thank James C-eorgas of the University of Athens, and Harry Hui of the University ofHong Kong, who collected this data from their social psychology classes. 1976) is that, in that case, the social environment often appears to them to be chaotic. It seems difficult to sample chaos.
The less people sample the collective self, the more confusing should be their social identity. This is consistent with Tajfel's (1978) definition of identity, Baumeister's (1986a) discussion of the trivialization of ascribed attributes between the 16th and the 20th centuries, and Dragonas's (1983) studies of the selfconcepts of 11-and 12-year-olds in small villages, transitional cities, and a large city.
Factors that increase ethnocentrism (LeVine & Campbell, 1972) , such as external threat, competition with outgroups, and common fate, should also increase the probability that the collective self will be sampled.
Homogeneous relatively isolated cultures tend to be tight, and they will sample the collective self more than heterogeneous, centrally located cultures. This follows from perceptual mechanisms that are well-known. Quattrone (1986) reviewed perceptual studies that indicate that people who have few exposures to stimuli that have both common and distinct features tend to notice and remember the common elements first and the diverse elements only after many exposures to the stimulus set. Homogeneous, isolated cultures are primarily exposed to their particular ingroups, and so are likely to sample the collective self.
As indicated earlier, collectivism is associated with childrearing patterns that emphasize conformity, obedience, and reliability. Such patterns are usually associated with rewards for conformity to ingroup goals, which leads to internalization of the ingroup goals. Thus, people do what is expected of them, even if that is not enjoyable. Bontempo et al. (1989) randomly assigned subjects from a collectivist (Brazil) and an individualist (U.S.) culture to two conditions of questionnaire administration: public and private. The questionnaire contained questions about how the subject was likely to act when the ingroup expected a behavior that was costly to the individual (e.g., visit a friend in the hospital, when this was time consuming). Both of the questions How should the person act? and How enjoyable would it be to act? were measured. It was found that Brazilians gave the same answers under both the anonymous and public conditions. Under both conditions they indicated that they would do what was expected of them. The U.S. sample indicated they would do what was expected of them in the public but not in the private condition. The U.S. group's private answers indicated that the subjects thought that doing the costly behaviors was unlikely, and certainly not enjoyable. Under the very same conditions the Brazilians indicated that they thought the costly prosocial behaviors were likely and enjoyable. In short, the Brazilians had internalized the ingroup norms so that conformity to the ingroup appeared enjoyable to them.
When ingroups have resources that allow them to reward those who conform with ingroup norms and provide sanctions to those who do not conform, one expects individuals to sample the collective self more than when ingroups do not have such resources. This is derived directly from behavior theory. Anthropological observations are also consistent with it. For example, in the case of extreme lack of resources, such as was observed among the Ik (Turnbull, 1972) , basic family structures and norms became irrelevant and did not regulate behavior.
The size of ingroups has some relevance to the question of sampling of the collective self. Very large ingroups (e.g., mankind) have very few (e.g., survival) and unclear goals and norms. The very definition of norm implies agreement. When the ingroup is large it is unlikely that monolithic conceptions of correct behavior will be found. Also, small ingroups, such as the nuclear family, can notice deviations from norms more readily and provide sanctions. Thus, we expect that the larger the size of the ingroup, the lower the probability that the collective self will be sampled. The data from Hawaii and Illinois, mentioned earlier, agree with this derivation. For example, the religious group (e.g., I am Roman Catholic) is dearly larger than the family and was mentioned less frequently than an educational institution (e.g., I am a student at the University of Hawaii), occupation (e.g., I am a computer programmer), ethnic group (e.g., I am a Japanese American), or the family. Very large ingroups (I am a citizen of the world) were mentioned by only 2 individuals out of a sample of 183.
Observations indicate that the extent to which an ingroup makes demands on individuals in few or in many areas shows considerable variance. For example, in the United States, states make very few demands (e.g., pay your income tax), whereas in China during the cultural revolution, the Communist Party made demands in many areas (artistic expression, family life, political behavior, civic action, education, athletics, work groups, even location, such as where to live). It seems plausible that the more areas of one's life that are affected by an ingroup, the more likely the individual is to sample the collective self. We do not yet have such data, but plan to collect them.
When individuals have few ingroups, they are more dependent on them. It follows that they are more likely to sample the collective self when they have fewer than when they have many ingroups. When many ingroups are salient, conflicting norms lead individuals to turn inward to decide what to do. Thus, they are more likely to sample the private self. But the resources available to the ingroups will moderate this tendency. An ingroup with large resources (e.g., a rich family) can "control" the individual even when other ingroups make conflicting demands. As conflict among ingroups increases, the individual will be more aware of the ingroups in conflict and hence will be more likely to sample the collective self.
Ingroups clearly vary in stability. A friendship group formed at a Saturday night party will have an impact during the period it is in existence, but will have little influence later. If an individual has stable ingroups there is a greater probability that the collective self will be sampled. Also, stable ingroups can reward and punish over long time periods, and thus will have to be considered by individuals more often than unstable ingroups.
We expect people in the more complex, individualistic, and loose cultures to sample the private self more than the public self, because complexity, individualism, and looseness lead to a more complex private self. Complexity means that if a person is not accepted by an ingroup, there will be other ingroups to which to turn; individualism means that the individual is not so attached to the ingroup that conformity to the ingroup is always essential; looseness means that if the person acts consistently with the private self, the ingroup will tolerate the behavior. Conversely, in collectivism, the opposite conditions are important; hence, there is more sampling of the public self. This is particularly the case if the culture is both collectivist and tight. I discuss the sampling of the private and public selves more extensively under cultural tightness.
Tight-Loose Cultures
Homogeneous, relatively isolated cultures tend to be tight, and they will sample the collective self more than will heterogeneous, centrally located cultures. The more homogeneous the culture, the more the norms will be clear and deviation from normative behavior can be punished. Cultural heterogeneity increases the confusion regarding what is correct and proper behavior. Also, cultural marginality tends to result in norm and role conflict and pressures individuals toward adopting different norms. Because rejection of the ingroup members who have adopted norms of a different culture can be costly, individuals moderate their need to make their ingroup members conform to their ideas of proper behavior. So, the culture becomes loose (i.e., tolerant of deviations from norms).
The looser the culture, the more the individual can choose what self to sample. If several kinds of collective self are available, one may choose to avoid norm and role conflict by rejecting all of them and developing individual conceptions of proper behavior. Thus, sampling of the private self is more likely in loose cultures and sampling of the collective self is more likely in tight cultures. Also, tight cultures tend to socialize their children by emphasizing the expectations of the generalized other. Hence, the public self will be complex and will be more likely to be sampled. In other words, tight cultures tend to sample the public and collective self, whereas loose cultures tend to sample the private self.
When the culture is both collectivist and tight, then the public self is extremely likely to be sampled. That means people act "properly" as that is defined by society, and are extremely anxious in case they do not act correctly. Their private self does not matter. As a result, the private and public selves are often different. Doi (1986) discussed this point extensively, comparing the Japanese public self (tatemae) with the private self (honne). He suggested that in the United States there is virtue in keeping public and private consistent (not being a hypocrite). In Japan, proper action matters. What you feel about such action is irrelevant. Thus, the Japanese do not like to state their personal opinions, but rather seek consensus.
Consistently with Doi's (1986) arguments is Iwao's (1988) research. She presented scenarios to Japanese and Americans and asked them to judge various actions that could be appropriate responses to these situations. For example, one scenario (daughter brings home person from another race) included as a possible response "thought that he would never allow them to marry but told them he was in favor of their marriage?' This response was endorsed as the best by 44% of the Japanese sample but by only 2% of the Americans; it was the worse in the opinion of 48% of the Americans and 7% of the Japanese.
Although the private self may be complex, this does not mean that it will be communicated to others if one can avoid such communication. In fact, in tight cultures people avoid disclosing much of the self, because by disclosing they may reveal some aspect of the self that others might criticize. In other words, they may be aware of the demands of the generalized other and avoid being vulnerable to criticism by presenting little of this complex self to others. Barlund (1975) reported studies of the self-disclosure to same-sex friend, opposite-sex friend, mother, father, stranger, and untrusted acquaintance in Japan and in the United States. The pattern of self-disclosure was the same--that is, more to same-sex friend, and progressively less to opposite-sex friend, mother, father, stranger, and least to the untrusted acquaintance. However, the amount disclosed in each relationship was about 50% more in the United States than in Japan.
Cultural Complexity
The more complex the culture, the more confused is likely to be the individual's identity. Dragonas (1983) sampled the selfconcepts of 11-and 12-year-olds in Greek small villages (simple), traditional cities (medium), and large cities (complex) cultures. She found that the more complex the culture, the more confusing was the identity. Similarly, Katakis (1976 Katakis ( , 1978 Katakis ( , 1984 found that the children of farmers and fisherman, when asked what they would be when they are old, unhesitatingly said farmer or fisherman, whereas in the large cities the responses frequently were of the "I will find myself" variety. Given the large number of ingroups that are available in a complex environment and following the logic presented here, individuals may well opt for sampling their private self and neglect the public or collective selves.
Content of Self in Different Cultures
The specific content of the self in particular cultures will reflect the language and availability of mythological constructs of that culture. Myths often provide ideal types that are incorporated in the self forged in a given culture (Roland, 1984a) . For example, peace of mind and being free of worries have been emphasized as aspects of the self in India (Roland, 1984b) and reflect Indian values that are early recognizable in Hinduism and Buddhism (which emerged in India). Mythological, culture-specific constructs become incorporated in the self (Sinha, 1982 (Sinha, , 1987b . Roland (1984b) claimed that the private self is more "organized around 'we" 'our' and 'us'..." (p. 178) in India than in the West. But particular life events may be linked to more than one kind of self. For example, Sinha (1987b) found that the important goals of Indian managers are their own good health and the good health of their family (i.e., have both private and collective self-elements). Sinha (personal communication, November 1985) believes the public self is different in collectivist and individualist cultures. In individualistic cultures it is assumed that the generalized other will value autonomy, independence, and self-reliance, and thus individuals will attempt to act in ways that will impress others (i.e., indicate that they have these attributes). To be distinct and different are highly valued, and people find innumerable ways to show themselves to others as different (in dress, possessions, speech patterns). By contrast, in collectivist cultures, conformity to the other in public settings is valued. Thus, in a restaurant, everyone orders the same food (in traditional restaurants, only the visible leader gets a menu and orders for all). The small inconvenience of eating nonoptimal food is more than compensated by the sense of solidarity that such actions generate. In collectivist cultures, being "nice" to ingroup others is a high value, so that one expects in most situations extreme politeness and a display of harmony (Triandis, Marin, Lisansky, & Betancourt, 1984) . Thus, in collectivist cultures, the public self is an extension of the collective self. One must make a good impression by means of prosocial behaviors toward ingroup members, acquaintances, and others who may become ingroup members. At the same time, one can be quite rude to outgroup members, and there is no concern about displaying hostility, exploitation, or avoidance of outgroup members.
The collective self, in collectivist cultures, may be structured in concentric circles (Hsu, 1985) . Hsu distinguishes eight layers, from the unconscious self to the self facing the "outer world" of strangers. Howev~, this much refinement of concepts seems difficult to test empirically.
The collective self in collectivist cultures includes elements such as "I am philotimos" (traditional Greece, meaning "I must act as is expected of me by my family and friends"; see Triandis, 1972) , "I must sacrifice myself for my ingroup," "I feel good when I display affection toward my ingroup;' and "I must maintain harmony with my ingroup even when that is very disagreeable." The person is less self-contained in collectivist than in individualistic cultures (Roland, 1984b, p. 176) .
Identity is defined on the basis of different elements in individualistic and collectivist cultures. tions) . In collectivist cultures, identity is defined more in terms ofrelationships---I am the mother of X, I am a member of family Y, and I am a resident of Z. Furthermore, the qualities that are most important in forming an identity can be quite different. In Europe and North America, being logical, rational, balanced, and fair are important attributes; in Africa, personal style, ways of moving the unique spontaneous self, sincere selfexpression, unpredictability, and emotional expression are most valued. The contrast between classical music (e.g., Bach or Mozart) and jazz reflects this difference musically.
Consequences of Sampling the Private and Collective Self
In the previous section I examined the relationship between the three dimensions of cultural variation and the probabilities of differential sampling of the private, public, and collective selves. In this section I review some of the empirical literature that is relevant to the theoretical ideas just presented.
An important consequence of sampling the collective self is that many of the elements of the collective become salient. Norms, roles, and values (i.e., proper ways of acting as defined by the collective) become the "obviously" correct ways to act. Behavioral intentions reflect such processes. Thus, the status of the other person in the social interaction--for example, is the other an ingroup or an outgroup member--becomes quite salient. Consequently, in collectivist cultures, individuals pay more attention to ingroups and outgroups and moderate their behavior accordingly, than is the case in individualistic cultures (Triandis, 1972) .
Evidence in support of this point has been provided by a study of Gudykunst, Yoon, and Nishida (1987) , who had subjects from Korea (very collectivist), Japan (somewhat collectivist), and the United States (very individualistic culture) interact with ingroup members (classmates) and outgroup members (strangers). After the interaction, the subjects rated several attributes of the interaction, such as the degree of intimacy, depth, breadth, coordination, and the difficulty they experienced during the interaction. A LISREL analysis showed the same structures of the rated attributes in the three cultures. The factors were called personalization (intimate, deep, broad, flexible, spontaneous, smooth, and satisfying interactions) , synchronization (effortless, well coordinated), and di~culty. As expected, in collectivist cultures, interacting with ingroup members was more personalized and synchronized and less difficult than in individualistic cultures. The difference when interacting with the ingroup and the outgroup was larger in the collectivist than in the individualist cultures. The size of t tests for the ingroup versus the outgroup ratings of the interaction is suggestive. Although all of them were significant at p < .00 l, their sizes were as follows: for personalization, United States, 5.9, Japan, 9.9, and Korea, 12.2; for synchronization, United States, 7. l, Japan, 8.9, and Korea, 9.2; and for difficulty, United States, 4.9, Japan, 7.7, and Korea, 10.9 . Thus, the more collectivist the culture, the more of a difference there is in the ingroup and outgroup interactions.
Who is placed in the ingroup is culture specific. For example, ratings of the "intimacy" of relationships on a 9-point scale suggest that in Japan there is more intimacy with acquaintances, coworkers, colleagues, best friends, and close friends than in the United States (Gudykunst & Nishida, 1986) . Atsumi (1980) argued that understanding Japanese social behavior requires distinguishing relationships with benefactors, true friends, coworkers, acquaintances, and outsiders (strangers). The determinants of social behavior shift depending on this classification. Behavior toward benefactors requires that the person go out of his way to benefit them. Behavior toward true friends is largely determined by the extent the behavior is enjoyable in itself, and the presence of these friends makes it enjoyable. Behavior toward coworkers is determined by both norms and cost/benefit considerations. Finally, behavior toward outsiders is totally determined by cost/benefit ratios.
Because individualistic cultures tend to be more complex (industrial, affluent), individuals can potentially be members of more ingroups (Verma, 1985) . If required behavior toward each ingroup is somewhat distinct, individuals should be higher in self-monitoring in individualistic than in collectivist cultures. Support for this prediction was obtained by Gudykunst, Yan~ and Nishida (1987) . They developed Korean and Japanese versions of the self-monitoring scale and found that the U.S. mean was higher than the Korean or Japanese means. Forgas and Bond (1985) asked collectivist (Hong Kong) and individualist (Australian) subjects to make multidimensional scaling judgments involving 27 episodes (e.g., arrive very late for a tutorial). They also used semantic differential scales to interpret the dimensions that did underlie these judgments. They found rather similar dimensions discriminating among the 27 episodes in the two cultures. However, the most important dimension (on the basis of variance accounted for) for the Hong Kong sample was not found in Australia, and the most important Australian dimension was not found in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong culture-specific dimension reflected inequalities of power, communal versus isolated episodes, and commonplace versus rare incidents. The semantic differential scales related to it were pleasant-unpleasant, communal-individualistic, and unequal-equal. Another Chinese dimension, only weakly present in Australia, included the intimate-nonintimate, involving-superficial, and pleasant-unpleasant scales. These ideas are clearly linked to collectivism, where pleasant, unequal, intimate, involving interactions are typical of relationships within the ingroup.
The Australian culture-specific dimension that discriminated the episodes reflected competitiveness: the scales, cooperation versus competition, pleasant versus unpleasant, relaxed versus anxious, and self-confident versus apprehensive. In a collectivist culture, then, the episodes were discriminated in terms of whether they had qualifies found in ingroup or outgroup relationships, whereas in an individualistic culture they were discriminated in terms of cooperation versus competition.
Although the concepts ingroup-outgroup and cooperationcompetition are parallel, there is a difference. There is a rigidity, inflexibility, difficulty of moving from group to group in the ingroup-outgroup distinction that is not present in the cooperation-competition contrast. One can think of athletic games in which a player moves from team to team, switching from cooperation to competition as a characteristic of individualism, whereas in collectivist cultures, mobility is less common.
The behavioral intentions of persons in collectivist cultures appear to be determined by cognitions that are related to the survival and benefit of their collective. In individualist cultures, the concerns are personal. An example comes from a study of smoking. A coflectivist sample (Hispanics in the U.S.) showed significantly more concern than an individualist sample (nonHispanics) about smoking affecting the health of others, giving a bad example to children, harming children, and bothering others with the bad smell of cigarettes, bad breath, and bad smell on clothes and belongings, whereas the individualist sample was more concerned about the physiological symptoms they might experience during withdrawal from cigarette smoking (G. V. Marin, Matin, Otero-Sabogal, Sabogal, & Perez.Stable, 1987) .
The emphasis on harmony within the ingroup, found more strongly in collectivist than in individualist cultures, results in the more positive evaluation of group-serving partners (Bond, Chiu, & Wan, 1984) , the choice of conflict resolution techniques that minimize animosity (Lenng, 1985 (Lenng, , 1987 , the greater giving of social support , and the greater support ofingroup goals (Nadler, 1986) . The emphasis on harmony may be, in part, the explanation of the lower heartattack rates among unacculturated than among acculturated Japanese-Americans (Marmot & Syme, 1976) . Clearly, a society in which confrontation is common is more likely to increase the blood pressure of those in such situations, and hence the probability of heart attacks; avoiding conflict and saving face must be linked to lower probabilities that blood pressure will become elevated. The probability of receiving social support in collectivist cultures may be another factor reducing the levels of stress produced by unpleasant life events and hence the probabilities of heart attacks (Triandis et al., 1988) .
Although ideal ingroup relationships are expected to be smoother, more intimate, and easier in collectivist cultures, outgroup relationships can be quite difficult. Because the ideal social behaviors often cannot be attained, one finds many splits of the ingronp in collectivist cultures. Avoidance relationships are frequent and, in some cases, required by norms (e.g., mother-in-law avoidance in some cultures). Fights over property are common and result in redefinitions of the ingroup. However, once the ingroup is defined, relationships tend to be very supportive and intimate within the ingroup, whereas there is little trust and often hostility toward outgroup members. Gabrenya and Barba (1987) found that collectivists are not as effective in meeting strangers as are individualists. Triandis (1967) found unusually poor communication among members of the same corporation who were not ingroup members (close friends) in a collectivist culture. Bureaucracies in collectivist cultures function especially badly because people hoard information (Kaiser, 1984) . Manipulation and exploitation of outgroups is common (Pandey, 1986) in collectivist cultures. When competing with outgronps, collectivists are more competitive than individualists (Espinoza & Garza, 1985) even under conditions when competitiveness is counterproductive.
In individualistic cultures, people exchange compliments more frequently than in collectivist cultures (Barlund & Araki, 1985) . They meet people easily and are able to cooperate with them even if they do not know them weft (Gabrenya & Barba, 1987) . Because individualists have more of a choice concerning ingroup memberships, they stay in those groups with whom they can have relatively good relationships and leave groups with whom they disagree too frequently (Verma, 1985) .
Competition tends to be interpersonal in individualistic and intergroup in collectivist cultures (Hsu, 1983; Triandis et al., 1988) . Conflict is frequently found in family relationships in individualistic cultures and between families in collectivist cultures (Katakis, 1978) .
There is a substantial literature (e.g., Berman, Murphy-Betman, Singh, 1985; Berman, Murphy-Berman, Singh, & Kumar, 1984; Hui, 1984; G. Marin, 1985; Triandis et al., 1985) indicating that individualists are more likely to use equity, and collectivists to use equality or need, as the norms for the distribution of resources (Yang, 1981) . This is consistent with the emphasis on trading discussed earlier. By contrast, the emphasis on communal relationships (Mills & Clark, 1982) found in collectivist cultures leads to emphases on equality and need. The parallel with gender differences, where men emphasize exchange and women emphasize communal relationships (i.e., equity and need; Major & Adams, 1983; Brockner & Adsit, 1986) , respectively, is quite striking. Private self-consciousness, also, tends to result in the use of equity, whereas public self-consciousness increases the probability that the equality norm will be used (Carver & Scheier, 1985) .
Situational Determinants of Emphases on Different Selves
In addition to culture, the situation determines how the self is sampled. Sampling of the collective self is more likely and more detailed (Lobel, 1986) when the ingroup is distinctive in the particular situation (McGuire, McGuire, Child, and Fujioka, 1978) . In public situations, such as when the person is identiffed by name or has to "perform" in public, the public self is more likely to be sampled. In private situations, as when the individual is anonymous or deindividuated (e.g., Zimbardo, 1969) , the public self may not be sampled at all. In situations in which future interaction between the person and others is expected, the public self is more likely to be sampled. Although a camera is likely to engage the public self, a mirror is likely to emphasize the private self (Scheier & Carver, 1980) . In situations in which no future interaction with another is expected, the private self will be emphasized.
There is evidence that insecure (Bettelheim & Janowitz, 1950; Triandis & Triandis, 1960) and cognitively simple (Rokeach, 1960) individuals are more likely to conform to ingroup norms. It seems plausible that the same conditions will result in greater sampling of the collective self.
To the extent that ingroup membership is rewarding (e.g., confers high status), that there is competition with outgroups, that the ingroup is frequently mentioned in childhood socialization (e.g., patriotic songs are frequently used in schools), and that the ingroup has distinct norms and values from other salient groups, we also expect that the collective self will be sampied.
The greater an individual's dependence on a collective, the more likely it is that the individual will sample the collective self.
In many nonliterate cultures, survival depends on resources that are scarce and unpredictable. Social patterns are often found that increase the probability of survival by sharing resources. For example (see Triandis, 1988 , for a review), in many such cultures, after hunting, one is expected to divide the food among ingroup members, or there is a strong preference for food grown by another rather than oneself. Such patterns increase interdependence. It seems plausible that they will be associated with greater sampling oftbe collective and public self.
In simple, noncomplex cultures there are, by definition, fewer potential ingroups. When there are few ingroups, an ingroup has a greater probability of influencing its members; hence, we expect greater sampling of the collective self. Also, in simple cultures, both groups and individuals have fewer goals (often just the goal of survival), and thus the probability of overlap of group/individual goals is higher. As cultural complexity increases, so does the number of goals and so does the probability that the goals will not overlap, and hence the greater the sampiing of the private self. Nail's (1986) useful analysis of social responses when the individual is under the influence of others emphasizes eight types of responses to pressures from others. The analysis is focused on the public and private self, but the very same analysis can also be done with the collective and private selves.
Conclusions
Aspects of the self (private, public, and collective) are differentially sampled in different cultures, depending on the complexity, level of individualism, and looseness oftbe culture. The more complex, individualistic, and loose the culture, the more likely it is that people will sample the private self and the less likely it is that they will sample the collective self. When people sample the collective self, they are more likely to be influenced by the norms, role definitions, and values of the particular collective, than when they do not sample the collective self. When they are so influenced by a collective, they are likely to behave in ways considered appropriate by members of that collective. The more they sample the private self, the more their behavior can be accounted for by exchange theory and can be described as an exchange relationship. The more they sample the collective self, the-less their behavior can be accounted for by exchange theory; it can be described as a communal relationship. However, social behavior is more likely to be communal when the target of that behavior is an ingroup member than when the target is an outgroup member. Ingroups are defined by common goals, common fate, the presence of an external threat, and/or the need to distribute resources to all ingroup members for the optimal survival of the ingroup. Outgroups consist of people with whom one is in competition or whom one does not trust. The ingroup-outgroup distinction determines social behavior more strongly in collectivist than in individualist cultures. When the culture is both collectivist and tight, the public self is particularly likely to be sampled. In short, a major determinant of social behavior is the kind of self that operates in the particular culture.
